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DRIVING OFF THE FACE OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: WEIGHING CABALLES UNDER
THE PROPOSED “VEHICULAR FRISK”
STANDARD
Christopher M. Pardo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although society charges law enforcement with eliminating illegal
drug activity, the individual Fourth Amendment rights1 of every
American citizen must also be respected. In Illinois v. Caballes,2 the
Supreme Court held that a trained drug-detection dog’s sniff does not
constitute a search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and that the
dog’s alert, in itself, constitutes the requisite probable cause to search a
citizen’s vehicle. Although Caballes may be effective in helping police
battle a burgeoning drug trade, as it allows police to walk a drugdetection dog around any lawfully stopped vehicle, it also creates a
situation ripe for the exploitation of underprivileged citizens—such as a
situation where police conduct a traffic stop on false pretenses and the
drug-detection dog then mistakenly alerts to the vehicle. American
society is divided along economic and racial lines. These divisions in
American society can be exacerbated, either inadvertently or purposely,
through legally approved methods that further the violation of
J.D., St. Thomas University School of Law (2007); B.A. English Literature, Boston
College (2004); attorney at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP; member of the Florida Bar.
Dedicated to Emily D'Amour Pardo and the entire Pardo family. Special thanks to Tamara
Lawson, Elizabeth Pendo, and Amy D. Ronner for their support and for sharing their vast
knowledge and advice.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches. Id. Specifically, it
provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[] . . . .” Id. But
searches are permissible upon a showing of “probable cause[]” Id. Difficult to define in a
technical sense, probable cause is the showing that the government must satisfy in order to
be allowed to conduct a full Fourth Amendment search. State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175,
1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1991)).
Probable cause has been explained as follows:
As a legal concept, “probable cause” is not capable of a bright-line test.
Rather, it involves a fact-intensive analysis that necessarily varies from
context to context. In particular, the courts are required to weigh two
interests that usually are in conflict: society’s recognition that its police
forces should be given discretion to investigate any reasonable
probability that a crime has occurred, and the individual’s interest in
not being subjected to groundless intrusions upon privacy.
Id.
2
See 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
*
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constitutional rights and encourage mistreatment of the more vulnerable
segments of society, namely poor and minority citizens.
The Caballes decision could have been decided many different ways,
and some ways may have been more logical when viewed in the context
of the Fourth Amendment’s balancing of personal and government
interests. In the absence of even the merest reasonable suspicion, a drugdetection dog’s alert should not be considered sufficient to merit
probable cause.
The Caballes Court could have ruled that a dog-sniff was the
automotive equivalent to a frisk; therefore, before allowing a drugdetection dog to sniff a car, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio,3 the officer would
need an articulable and reasonable suspicion that crime was “afoot” and
would not, for example, be allowed to frisk a citizen stopped for
speeding, absent any other facts. Applying this Terry standard to drugdetection, dog use would lead to more fair and just results for several
reasons.
First, alerts by drug-detection dogs, as delineated in the Caballes
dissent, are not reliable enough to qualify alone as probable cause.4
Although the conclusion reached from the research is not absolute, and
each dog is different, even a single mistake justified through application
of the Caballes standard should be considered one too many. Raising the
standard even slightly takes away the accountability for the mistakes
from a dog and places it more squarely on the officer.
Second, a standard such as that promulgated by the Caballes Court
unnecessarily exposes society’s disadvantaged members to racial, age,
gender, and economic profiling by police. As further discussed below,
the Supreme Court’s decision allows officers to walk a drug-detection
dog around any lawfully stopped vehicle, but does not require that they

3
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court established
that stopping and frisking an individual was a “‘seizure[]’” and “search” under the Fourth
Amendment, but it was not unreasonable so long as the officer had a
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer
acted reasonably[,] . . . [the officer must be able to point to] specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience.
Id. at 27 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Thus, for these types of searches, probable
cause is not required, but the Fourth Amendment still requires some level of protection for
the citizen. Id.
4
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
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walk the dog around every lawfully stopped vehicle. This level of
discretion, not checked by any court-mandated requirement of
reasonable suspicion, is merely one more weapon in an arsenal to exploit
anyone against whom an officer feels a conscious or sub-conscious
prejudice.
The Court could have reworked, and ultimately applied, its same
basic reasoning from Kyllo v. United States5 and held that a dog-sniff—
essentially the use of a sensory-enhancement device—constituted a fullblown search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring
probable cause of wrongdoing or the procurement of a warrant before
allowing a trained drug-detection dog to sniff a citizen’s vehicle.6 This
approach would be problematic for several reasons. For example, it may
create an inconsistency by extending the sanctity of the home argument
from the Kyllo decision to the already de-sanctified automobile.
Additionally, through analogy, the Court could have considered the
weight that a drug-detection dog’s alert is given in civil forfeiture of
contraband cases, where the courts require more than a mere dog-alert to
sustain a finding of probable cause. Both civil and criminal laws apply a
“probable cause” standard to searches when deciding whether law
enforcement should be granted access to a citizen’s vehicle. Generally,
when determining probable cause, the civil law does not recognize a
dog-alert by itself as sufficient to merit the probable cause necessary to
support seizure, and ultimately forfeiture, of a citizen’s personal
possessions. On the other hand, the criminal law, through Caballes,
considers a dog-alert enough to meet probable cause to invade
someone’s private space, regardless of whether there is reason to believe
that contraband is hidden in a vehicle. To effectuate a more coherent
approach to probable cause, either the standard for probable cause
meriting seizure should be relaxed, or the standard for showing probable
cause meriting a search should be heightened.
As further discussed in this Article, raising the required standard for
probable cause would appropriately meet both the government’s
interest—preventing the movement of illegal contraband—and the
interest of citizens—protecting individual privacy rights. Treating a
dog-sniff as a “vehicular frisk” would best balance the important
government interest of preventing drug-trafficking and a citizen’s

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36, 34–37 (2001) (holding that both the use of
sensory enhancing devices and inferences drawn from them are searches pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment, where a sensory-enhancement device was directed at a citizen’s
personal dwelling because it exposed “intimate details” from inside the person’s home).
6
See id. at 34–37.
5
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fundamental, constitutional right of protection against unreasonable
searches.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AND AGAINST THE CABALLES
HOLDING
In order to understand the seemingly inconsistent, ill-supported, and
intrusive standard adopted by the Supreme Court, one must reflect on
the policy considerations that have led to the current standard. Drugdetecting dogs are often used to combat a rampant drug-trade.7 Thus,
even though the police cannot corroborate whether a drug-detection
police dog is actually alerting to drugs before conducting a search
pursuant to the alert, the dog is generally considered to be a reliable
source of information about illicit activity.8 Yet, despite the general
acceptance of trained-dog alerts as reliable, courts rarely rely solely on
that one indication of illegal narcotics activity to establish probable cause
to merit seizure of money for forfeiture purposes, even when the person
whose money is being seized may be arrested for some other criminal
violation.9 For example, the court in Jones interpreted the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act to mean that “a positive alert by a drug dog
to narcotics on currency, standing alone, does not constitute evidence
that the money was used in a drug transaction[]” because, even though
there were also marijuana stems and seeds found in his vehicle, the
money could not actually be linked to any drug transaction.10 In the
context of probable cause meriting forfeiture of personal possessions, the
Jones court stated that a dog alert does not, without more, create a link to
illicit drug activity.
On the other hand, police need to establish probable cause in order
to search a suspicious individual, because, through the Fourth
Amendment, each American citizen is granted freedom from
unreasonable searches, where the notion of “search” is to be determined

See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Evidence Considered in Tracing Currency, Bank
Account, or Cash Equivilancy to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or Declaration
as Contraband, Under State Law—Odor of Drugs, 116 A.L.R. 5th 325, 325 (2004).
8
Although it is a negatively-reviewed minority view, Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t,
505 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), put so much weight on the alert of a drugdetecting dog that the court explained “[a]n alert by a trained, experienced narcotics
dog[] . . . is in itself enough to establish probable cause for an arrest, that [a] chapter 893
[Florida statute stating that contraband goods are subject to forfeiture] violation has
occurred . . . .” Id.
9
See Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
10
Id.
7
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with reference to a person’s expectation of privacy,11 so long as society
deems that expectation reasonable.12 In situations in which police gather
information to obtain probable cause to search a home, the Supreme
Court has upheld the reasonable expectation of privacy at its highest,
ruling that certain attempts to obtain the requisite information to merit
probable cause constituted searches in themselves.13
Although the policy of protecting a citizen’s reasonable expectation
of privacy in the home has been steadfastly upheld via the Fourth
Amendment, the expectation of privacy protected by the United States
Supreme Court regarding automobiles14 has been so eroded that one
Fourth Amendment scholar, when explaining the expectation of privacy
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (speaking of
subjective expectation).
12
See generally id. Hence, lacking a reasonable expectation of privacy, a question of
reasonableness of the search cannot even arise, in default of the very constitutive elements
of the notion of “search.” Id.
13
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that gaining probable cause for a
search warrant by obtaining information through the use of sense-enhancing technology
regarding the interior of the home, which could not have been obtained without physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment—at least where the technology in question is not in general public use); see
also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980). This case states:
It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. Yet is [sic] is also well settled that objects such as
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the
police without a warrant. The seizure of property in plain view
involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable,
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with
criminal activity.
Payton, 445 U.S. at 586–87 (footnote omitted). But see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986). The Court held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
when he puts up a fence around his yard, where police observe, with the naked eye, from a
low-flying airplane, that he is committing illegal acts in his backyard. Id. In such a case,
the person’s activities are visible to the naked eye. Id. “What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.” Id. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
14
See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Belton was pulled over for
speeding, and was taken outside of the car away from the vehicle. Id. at 456. He was
handcuffed and arrested, leaving no opportunity for him to either get something from the
car or destroy any evidence. Id. The police then searched the car, found a coat inside the
car, opened his coat pocket, and found cocaine. Id. Belton was later indicted for possession
of a controlled substance, and the United States Supreme Court held that the search
without a warrant was reasonable, even though the vehicle was secured by the police. Id.
The Court reasoned that the expectation of privacy in a vehicle is low. Id. at 457. See also
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (creating a bright-line rule that officers can search an
arrested person’s vehicle at their police station, without showing probable cause for a
warrant, regardless of the fact that they could have easily obtained a warrant to search the
car, based on probable cause that evidence was inside the car).
11
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in a vehicle to her criminal procedure class, describes driving in a car as,
“skidding off the face of the Fourth Amendment.”15
When considering the Fourth Amendment constitutional rights of a
citizen in a vehicle, Supreme Court cases mainly focus on the reduced
expectation of privacy in a vehicle when probable cause existed to obtain
a search warrant. Based primarily on the effect of the reduced
expectation of vehicle privacy rights, the United States Supreme Court
recently and ominously held in Caballes that allowing a drug-sniffing dog
to smell around a car during a routine traffic stop, where an arrest would
not be warranted under the law, did not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment, and was merely a valid way of obtaining probable
cause to search a vehicle for contraband.16
The Supreme Court deftly carved a distinction between Caballes and
past cases, such as Kyllo,17 based on the differences between privacy
expectations in a house versus in a car. This is especially true
considering the difference between the potentially lawful activities that
the use of sensory-enhancing equipment could have exposed in Kyllo18
15
Interview with Professor Amy D. Ronner, St. Thomas University School of Law
(October, 2005).
16
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005).
17
Id. at 409. The Court explained as follows:
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the
use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a
home constituted an unlawful search . . . . The legitimate expectation
that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is
categorically distinguishable from [Caballes]’s hopes or expectations
concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.
Id. at 409–10 (citations omitted).
18
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38–39. The Supreme Court recently explained the “intimate
details” which could be exposed through the use of sense-enhancing technology, and the
reason the prohibition of thermal imaging was necessary:
Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to “intimate details”
would not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in
application, failing to provide “a workable accommodation between
the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment[.]” To begin with, there is no necessary connection
between the sophistication of the surveillance equipment and the
“intimacy” of the details that it observes—which means that one
cannot say (and the police cannot be assured) that use of the relatively
crude equipment at issue here will always be lawful. The Agema
Thermovision 210 [the heat-sensing device used by the law
enforcement officers] might disclose, for example, at what hour each
night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail
that many would consider “intimate”; and a much more sophisticated
system might detect nothing more intimate than the fact that someone
left a closet light on. We could not, in other words, develop a rule
approving only that through-the-wall surveillance which identifies
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(although marijuana was found in Kyllo) and the illegal activity that took
place in Caballes. In fact, one recent Florida case,19 upon remand by the
Supreme Court so as to reconsider its holding in light of the Caballes
decision, held that when a drug-dog was taken to the front of a citizen’s
house and alerted to the house, the police officer had conducted a
warrantless search and, thus, violated the Fourth Amendment.20 This
holding, considered in light of Caballes and Kyllo, must already be seen as
placing a limitation on, or carving out an exception to, the Caballes
holding, on the basis that the expectation of privacy in a house is much
greater than that in a vehicle.21
The Caballes Court tried to rationalize searching the defendant’s car
based on the resulting discovery of drugs in the car, but the Court
ignored the results garnered by the search in Kyllo, where drugs were
also found. In an effort to differentiate the cases, the Court concluded,
“[t]he legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful
activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from
[Caballes]’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of
contraband in the trunk of his car.”22
Does an innocent citizen have a reasonable expectation that his
lawful activities will remain private when he steps into a vehicle? In
reality, does the above quotation answer that question? The quotation
above is a legal slight-of-hand, which should not be allowed to confuse
the protection against unreasonable searches with the protection of the
home.
Although, for allegedly clear policy reasons,23 different
expectations of privacy exist between a vehicle and a house, it is a
objects no smaller than 36 by 36 inches, but would have to develop a
jurisprudence specifying which home activities are “intimate” and
which are not. And even when (if ever) that jurisprudence were fully
developed, no police officer would be able to know in advance whether
his through-the-wall surveillance picks up “intimate” details—and
thus would be unable to know in advance whether it is constitutional.
Id. (citation omitted).
19
See State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
20
See Carl Jones, From the Courts: Appellate Review, Daily Business Review, Broward,
September 19, 2005, at A16.
21
Id. (stating that the dissent argued “the majority was creating a ‘residence exception’
in the precedent established by Caballes . . . [although] determining the legality of drug
dog’s work based on place was not a legal analysis the U.S. Supreme Court had yet
established.”).
22
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added).
23
See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (delineating the policy that
vehicles may be searched only upon a showing of probable cause, but that they may be
searched without meeting the warrant requirement because of their heightened mobility
and the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy, as vehicles are on wheels and
the use of vehicles is highly regulated by the government).
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separate policy argument that any innocent citizen should be protected
from searches that invade that reasonable expectation, however highly or
lowly courts regard that expectation.
A. Caballes Exacerbates Potential Police Infringements on the Individual
Right to Privacy by Giving Too Much Weight to Potentially Inaccurate
Drug-Detection Dog Alerts
Due to the nearly pandemic proportions to which the sale and use of
illegal drugs has grown, the Caballes decision does take an important step
in helping police stop anyone who is transporting drugs, as it allows
police to walk a drug-detection dog around a vehicle in the absence of
probable cause. However, the holding exposes society’s impoverished
and underprivileged to potential violations of their constitutional rights.
Since Caballes, case law can fairly be described as running the gamut
from unthinking adherence to the Supreme Court’s basic holding to
defiant differentiation from the Caballes Court’s factual scenario.24 In
Commonwealth v. Feyenord, the Massachusetts Supreme Court argued that
the use of a trained narcotics detection dog is both “intimidating” and
“upsetting” to an innocent person who is stopped by the police,25
especially because even “[w]ell-trained dogs often ‘alert’ to innocent
people[,]” as the dissent acknowledged in Caballes.26
Particularly, in one case, a trained dog alerted to a junior-high school
girl, who was subsequently strip-searched, only to later find out that the
dog alerted to her because “the girl had been playing that morning with
her own dog, who was in heat.”27 Under Caballes, regardless of the
reason for the dog’s alert, police officers would have probable cause to
search her vehicle for contraband, despite their failure to show any other
indication of illicit activity.
In Caballes, the Supreme Court was clearly privy to information
showing that trained drug-detection dog alerts are not inherently
reliable, and Justice Souter went so far as to call the supposed reliability
of a drug-detection dog a “legal fiction.”28 Justice Souter’s dissent
analyzed, case-by-case, the reliability of drug-detection dogs in past
cases and found staggering results:29
See generally Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 833 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 2005).
Id. at 607–08.
26
Id. at 608 n.3 (citing to Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411).
27
Id. (citing to and discussing Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979)).
28
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29
Id. This Article is not a scientific study, and is merely taking the statistical research of
the United States Supreme Court as true. See id. This Article recognizes that drugdetection dog accuracy is a hotly debated scientific topic, as well as a legal topic. See id.
24
25
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The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into
the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed
infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing welltrained animals sniffing and alerting with less than
perfect accuracy, whether owing to errors by their
handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even
the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine.
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378
(C.A.10 1997) (describing a dog that had a 71% accuracy
rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378, n.
3 (C.A.10 1997) (describing a dog that erroneously
alerted 4 times out of 19 while working for the postal
service and 8% of the time over its entire career); United
States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (C.A.7 2001)
(accepting as reliable a dog that gave false positives
between 7% and 38% of the time); Laime v. State, 347 Ark.
142, 159, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (2001) (speaking of a dog
that made between 10 and 50 errors); United States v.
$242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (C.A.11 2003) (noting that
because as much as 80% of all currency in circulation
contains drug residue, a dog alert “is of little value”),
vacated on other grounds by rehearing en banc, 357 F.3d
1225 (C.A.11 2004); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194,
1214–1217 (C.A.3 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[A] substantial portion of
United States currency . . . is tainted with sufficient
traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine
to alert to their presence”).30
Justice Souter did not want to create a per se standard that a drugdetection dog alert is sufficient to merit probable cause to invade a
citizen’s privacy, particularly in situations where it has been proven that
dogs are accurate only half the time, or in some cases, significantly less
than half the time.
Should the Court interpret the Fourth Amendment so narrowly as to
allow for such potential intrusions against the privacy of innocent
American citizens in the name of compiling evidence to show probable
cause against a criminal? Even though the trafficking of contraband is a
tremendous societal problem, refusing to acknowledge that a dog-sniff
invokes the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
30

Id. at 411–12.
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searches creates a constitutional harm that tears the societal fabric that
preventing drug trafficking and other crime is supposed to preserve.
Initially, it is important to recognize that although different policy
considerations exist concerning Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it
relates to both vehicles and homes, these areas of the law do not exist in
a vacuum, and the logical links that allow them to be evaluated in a
consistent way must be considered.
B. The Caballes Holding Creates a New Avenue for Discriminatory Abuse of
the Poor and Minorities
As with other cases creating a bright-line Fourth Amendment rule,31
the Caballes decision is problematic because it subjects the American
citizen to a method of gathering information, in the pursuit of probable
cause, that is highly intrusive to the average American and ignores the
subjective intention of the acting officer.32 Allowing officers to conduct a
sensory identification of the air around a vehicle,33 and considering an
alert made pursuant to this sensory identification sufficient to merit
probable cause to search a vehicle, will undoubtedly lead to abuses
against anyone that an officer personally desires to harass or specifically
target, most notably the underprivileged and minorities.34
The Supreme Court, at least in part, recognized that granting
discretion to police officers to choose who they investigate could lead,
and has led, to groundless racial profiling, and, essentially, has led to
See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). The Court asserted
that, regarding the warrant exception for searches incident to an arrest, officers are not
required to specifically establish that they are promoting either of the twin-aims that justify
this bright-line rule, namely either protecting themselves from dangerous objects or finding
evidence to prove the violation. Id. at 236. In fact, the Defendant in Robinson demonstrated
that no justification existed, under either of the two policy goals of a search incident to
arrest, to merit searching the Defendant’s car. Id. at 240. It follows that, as the search
incident to arrest can be made without questioning the officer’s subjective intent, the
opportunity for abusive searches of certain targeted groups is not capable of challenge
under the Robinson rule. Id. at 248.
32
See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (reasserting the Robinson rule—that
following a bright-line rule which suspends the Fourth Amendment “arises independently
of a particular officer’s subjective concerns[]”).
33
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09. It is only semantically and legally that this is not
considered to be a search. According to Caballes, apparently there is not an expectation of
privacy that society is willing to acknowledge as reasonable. Id.
34
See generally Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 403, 403–09 (2001). Ronner argued that “repression[]” of
deeply buried racist feelings by police officers may lead to Fourth Amendment abuses
against minorities. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It seems that the behavior
leading to Professor Ronner’s concerns is exacerbated when police officers are given too
much discretion. Id.
31
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categorizing people as potential criminals based on their race.35 Because
the Court held that “sweep” interrogations did not merit a Fourth
Amendment violation, Justice Marshall was concerned with, what were
to him, the obvious collateral effects and abuses caused by allowing
police free reign to question riders on a bus about their activities and to
gain consent to search their bags without “articulable suspicion” of
wrongdoing (i.e., the showing needed to conduct a Terry stop).36
Although “the police who conduct these sweeps decline to offer a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing[,] . . . ”37 Justice
Marshall stated, “[i]t does not follow[] . . . that the approach of
passengers during a sweep is completely random.”38 Exemplifying the
obvious and dangerous opportunity for abusive police behavior created
by the recent Caballes decision, “at least one officer who routinely
confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a factor
influencing his decision whom to approach.”39
The Caballes decision should also be considered in light of
undeniable socioeconomic constraints under which certain factions of
society function. Fundamentally leading to more frequent and negative
police interaction, “African Americans and Hispanics tend to populate
poor, inner city neighborhoods, which are commonly known to be high

See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441 n.1 (1991). In Bostick, Justice Marshall states:
That is to say, the police who conduct these sweeps decline to offer a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing sufficient to
justify a warrantless “stop” or “seizure” of the confronted passenger.
It does not follow, however, that the approach of passengers during a
sweep is completely random. Indeed, at least one officer who
routinely confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a
factor influencing his decision whom to approach. See United States v.
Williams, No. 1:89CR0135 (ND Ohio, June 13, 1989), p. 3 (“Detective
Zaller testified that the factors initiating the focus upon the three
young black males in this case included: (1) that they were young and
black . . . .”), aff’d, No. 89-4083 (CA6, Oct. 19, 1990), p. 7 [916 F.2d 714
(table) ] (the officers “knew that the couriers, more often than not, were
young black males”), vacated and remanded, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct.
1572, 114 L.Ed.2d 74 (1991). Thus, the basis of the decision to single
out particular passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to
be inarticulable than unspeakable.
Id. (citations omitted).
36
See generally id. at 441–42.
37
Id. at 442 n.1.
38
Id.
39
Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, No. 1:89CR0135 (N.D. Ohio, June 13, 1989),
where an officer testified that his reasons for focusing on three black males included that
they were “young and black”).
35
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crime areas.”40 This is not the fault of the average member of a minority
group but is instead caused by basic societal inequities.41 In support of
her discussion, in Fleeing While Black, Amy D. Ronner paraphrases
George C. Galster’s argument in Polarization, Place, and Race to highlight
the most basic, and terrible, societal constraints imposed upon minority
groups, namely their everyday environment coupled with the
disadvantages that constant and widespread racism inflict upon them:
Members
of
racial-ethnic
minority
groups
disproportionately face an urban opportunity structure
that substantially constrains their mobility across
socioeconomic strata. Some of the most important placebased constraints include segregated housing; lack of
positive role models as neighbors; limitations on capital;
inferior public services; lower quality public education;
more violent, drug-infested neighborhoods; and
impaired access to employment and job-related
information networks. As if these spatial penalties were
not enough, racial-ethnic minorities face the additional
burdens of discrimination in a variety of markets.42
Common logic dictates that more crime in a specific geographic area
results in more negative interaction with police and a heightened
suspicion by those officers, regardless of their good intentions, of anyone
in those neighborhoods.
Hypothetically, in Florida, if one-thousand white men in their early
twenties and one-thousand black men in their early twenties were pulled
over by police for traffic infractions for which they could not be arrested
according to state law,43 all of the men could be subjected to a police dog
Ronner, supra note 34, at 386 (citing generally to George C. Galster, Polarization, Place,
and Race, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (1993)).
41
See id. at 385–88.
42
Id. at 385 n.18 (citing Galster, supra note 40) (in support of her discussion, in Fleeing
While Black, Amy D. Ronner paraphrases Galster’s argument in Polarization, Place, and Race
to highlight some of the most basic and terrible societal constraints imposed upon minority
groups, namely their everyday environment).
43
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). The United States Supreme
Court has clearly ruled that the Constitution does not prohibit the arrest of a person who is
pulled over for any traffic violation, even though a state offers more protection to its
citizens. Id. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless arrest for a
minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine,
so long as there is probable cause that the violation has been committed. Id. But see FLA.
STAT. § 316.1923 (2005) (mandating that “[a]ggressive careless driving,” alone, is not an
arrestable offense, and, thus, raising the standard for a traffic arrest in Florida above the
constitutionally protected floor) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
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sniffing the outside of their car for the scent of illegal contraband, at the
discretion of the officer. Although this hypothetical does not, in itself,
lead to a risk of Fourth Amendment reasonableness violations against
minority groups, it demonstrates a situation ripe for unreasonable police
action, particularly when considered alongside substantial statistical
evidence that “race is a significant factor in pretextual traffic stops[]”44
and that the vast majority of motorists stopped are drivers of color, even
though drivers of color constitute only a miniscule percentage of total
drivers.45
Considering these statistics, it can reasonably be inferred that the
majority of people who suffer from a lowered expectation of privacy in a
vehicle, and ultimately suffer from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement
of such a low standard to show probable cause to search a vehicle—
namely a mere police-dog alert—are, and will be, non-white, Black, and
Hispanic Americans.
Although the Supreme Court has come to many decisions that have
helped minorities,46 this is not the first Supreme Court holding which
seems to allow for the railroading of the rights of minorities.47 In one of
Ronner, supra note 34, at 387 n.24 (summarization of research by and citing to Angela
J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 431–32 (1997)).
45
Id. at 387 (citing to Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. at
431–32). Davis cites to research that exemplifies the racial turmoil being exacerbated by the
slackening enforcement of the Fourth Amendment:
[L]awsuits filed by black motorists in New Jersey and Maryland reveal
that 71 percent of the 437 motorists stopped and searched along a
northeastern stretch of Interstate 95 in the first nine months of 1995
were black. One hundred and forty-eight hours of videotaped traffic
stops in Florida revealed that seventy percent of the 1,048 motorists
stopped along Interstate 95 were black or Hispanic, even though
Blacks and Hispanics made up only five percent of the drivers on that
stretch of the highway. Less than one percent of the drivers received
traffic citations and only five percent of the stops resulted in an arrest.
Id. (quoting Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 431-32)
(footnotes omitted).
46
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1964)
(upholding the authority of the federal government to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964
in hotel desegregation, despite claims made both by segregationists and strictinterpretation constitutional scholars that the Commerce Clause should not be used to
promote desegregation).
47
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926). The Court allowed
for lower-income housing to be based out of specific areas, explaining:
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the
development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the
coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in
destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such
sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
44
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the clearest legal attempts to help American minorities, in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as constitutional when applying desegregation to
commercial interests, such as hotels.48 This was a difficult decision, as it
required an arguably creative reading of the Commerce Clause.49 On the
other hand, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court
determined that zoning against “apartment houses[]” should be allowed
because the apartment building, and inferably, that which it brings, is
“often . . . a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the
open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential
character of the district.”50 The Court went so far as to prophesize that
the introduction of apartment buildings negatively affects the singlefamily areas until “finally, the residential character of the neighborhood
and its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly
destroyed.”51 The Supreme Court may have been rationally concerned
about the effects of introducing apartment buildings into single-family
neighborhoods, and it is possible that the Court did not specifically
consider the effect that this decree would have on the rights of
minorities. However, as George Galster wrote in Polarization, Place, and
Race,52 the socioeconomic realities of American minorities lead them to
live in inexpensive housing, thus resulting in the type of heightened
societal segregation, which was created—justifiably or not—by the
landmark Village of Euclid decision.53

surroundings created by the residential character of the district.
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others,
interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the
disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the
occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger
portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving
children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by
those in more favored localities—until, finally, the residential character
of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached
residences are utterly destroyed.
Id.
See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 241.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
states, “[Congress shall have the power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]” Id.
50
See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
51
Id.
52
See Ronner, supra note 34, at 385 (citing Galster, supra note 40).
53
See generally Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (holding that the creation of zoning districts
for different types of land uses was constitutional).
48
49

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/3

Pardo: Driving Off the Face of the Fourth Amendment: Weighing Caballes u

2008]

The Proposed “Vehicular Frisk” Standard

127

Unlike the brave,54 but controversial, application of the Commerce
Clause in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., the Caballes Court could have more
easily looked toward the future effects of its ruling and to further a
system of law enforcement which would have limited opportunity for
police abuses, especially against those already oppressed by their
economic situation and racial background.55 Although the Supreme
Court could have easily held that dog-sniffs pursuant to a non-arrestable
traffic stop constitute warrantless searches through the use of sensoryenhancing technology, as it held in Kyllo,56 the Caballes Court instead
opened the door for further abuse of the rights of minorities. Minorities
are already disproportionately victims of traffic stops.57 Because the
Court failed to recognize the use of trained police dogs as a search and
instead authorized such a highly intrusive mechanism for obtaining
probable cause, when faced with a situation where there is a lack of
racial compassion, these same profiled and abused minorities will face
officers who carry one more high-tech weapon in their arsenal.
In these Caballes-like situations, officers can randomly decide to walk
a contraband-detection dog around a citizen’s car, even when the citizen
is cooperative during a minor traffic stop. Based on actual admissions of
past racial profiling abuses by police officers,58 the threat of racial abuse
clearly exists. The Court should not continue facilitating this abuse of
minorities by creating new abuse-ripe precedent that grants officers even
more discretion in picking random targets that are not actually
“completely [racially] random.”59 Instead, the Court should require a
reasonable basis for selecting targets, in a way that protects poor and
minority citizens and does not leave them vulnerable to persecution
based on nothing more “articulable”60 than skin color.
54
Just like the ruling that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to pass the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 may have permanently stunted the positive effects of the civil
rights movement, Caballes was a brave, risky, and ultimately debatable decision that is
presently accepted without any serious debate.
55
See generally Galster, supra note 40.
56
See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
57
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1991).
58
See id. at 441 n.1. This footnote cites to several cases supporting this assertion, namely:
United States v. Williams, No. 1:89CR0135 (ND Ohio, June 13, 1989), p. 3
([”]Detective Zaller testified that the factors initiating the focus upon
the three young black males in this case included: (1) that they were
young and black . . . .[”]), aff’d, No. 89-4083 (CA6, Oct. 19, 1990), p. 7
[916 F.2d 714 (table) ] [and] (the officers [‘]knew that the couriers, more
often than not, were young black males[”]), vacated and remanded,
500 U.S. 901 (1991).
Id. (citation omitted).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Considering repeated holdings that the Fourth Amendment does not
allow for abuse, coupled with the Caballes decision’s allowance of police
discretion to abuse the poor and other minorities, perhaps Justice
Marshall best articulated the fear of abuse faced by minorities when he
stated that the “basis of the decision to single out particular passengers
during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than
unspeakable.”61
C. Considering A Reality-Based Hypothetical Under the Effects of the
Caballes Holding
In order to truly appreciate the problems caused by the Caballes
holding, consider the following hypothetical situation, based loosely on
an actual case reviewed by the Ninth Circuit in 2000:
While dropping their friend off at home in an upper-class white suburb, two
black high school students rode in the front seat of a car that the driver bought
with money saved from his job coaching baseball at his local Boys and Girls
Club. Their white friend sat in the backseat. After making a legal turn, the boys
were pulled over by a white police officer. The officer stated that the car’s taillight was malfunctioning and that violation of the traffic code merited giving the
driver a ticket. This was a false pretense for making the stop because, as the boys
knew, the tail-light was working fine. The officer then looked into the car, and
as he had only seen the black teenagers in the front seat until that point, asked
the “[white teen] whether he knew the two black teens, whether they were
actually his friends, and how long he had known them.”62 Then he asked “the
two African American teens, ‘[w]hat are you doing out here?’”63 “Here[,]” the
boys knew, meant a “white” neighborhood. The officer then said to one of the
black teenagers, “You’re not supposed to be here.”64 With that, he informed
them that he was printing out a traffic citation and told them not to move. The
officer, while still speaking, led his trained, narcotics-detection dog from the
patrol car and walked it around the vehicle’s perimeter, where the dog sniffed the
entire body of the vehicle, never making a noise. Then, while the officer was
writing a ticket, his dog indiscriminately barked. The officer then made the boys
get out of the car. He searched the entire vehicle, found nothing suspicious, and
ordered the boys back into the vehicle. The officer then shoved the ticket into the

Id. at 441, n.1.
Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000). It should be noted that although
the quotations in this hypothetical are taken from this historical case, the issues raised in
the hypothetical are not similar to those of the cited case. The purpose of using these actual
quotations is to show that, unfortunately, the possibility for abuses, in many cases, will
lead to their realization. Fact, sometimes, as in Price v. Kramer, is more horrible than fiction.
63
Id. at 1242.
64
Id. at 1243.
61
62
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driver’s hand. Before letting the petrified young men leave, “the officer[‘]s last
words to the boys were, ‘[g]et the hell out of here.’”65
This aforementioned scenario, police officer’s language, and
fabricated reason for the traffic stop are based on an actual case of
abusive police conduct, which was deemed a Fourth Amendment
violation.66 Although the actual case involved an illegal use of force
against the citizens by the officer,67 merely substituting that illegal use of
force with a now-legal police dog-sniff and subsequent vehicular search
exemplifies the opportunity for highly intrusive and subjective police
conduct. This should have been reasonably anticipated by the Supreme
Court as an unavoidable result of its most recent articulation of the law
delineating whether a trained, drug-alerting dog’s sniff constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.68 But for allowing the dog to sniff
the vehicle, the stop would have been much less intrusive on the young
citizens’ right to privacy.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED “VEHICULAR FRISK” STANDARD AND
THE POTENTIAL RATIONALES FOR AND EFFECTS OF A DIFFERENT SUPREME
COURT RULING IN CABALLES
As stated in the Introduction,69 Caballes could have been decided
many different ways, for many different reasons. At least some of these
alternative decisions more appropriately balance the interests of both the
government and individuals when viewed in light of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
A. The Full-Blown Search Alternative: Application of the Kyllo Reasoning
and Problems With Extending It to Vehicles
The Caballes Court could have ruled differently had it adopted its
Kyllo reasoning and held that a dog-sniff constituted a full-blown search
as a sensory-enhancement device pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
The Court could have required probable cause before ever allowing a
trained drug-detection dog to sniff a citizen’s vehicle. Although
adopting Kyllo may lead to a more fair result, as discussed below, this
approach would be problematic for many reasons.
As stated earlier in this Article, although the trafficking of
contraband is a tremendous societal problem, refusing to acknowledge a
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 1251.
See generally id.
Id.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
See supra Parts I–II.
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dog-sniff as triggering the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches creates a constitutional harm that tears the
societal fabric that preventing drug trafficking, and other crime, is
supposed to preserve. If the Caballes Court had merely applied Kyllo’s
analysis70 to an officer initiating a dog-sniff around a vehicle when no
articulable suspicion of contraband or “[crime] afoot[]”71 existed, it
would have avoided entirely the possibility of exacerbating the already
rampant abuse of the rights of minorities by discretionary police action.
The Court decided otherwise, taking a different and equally extreme
route. American citizens, particularly minorities, will now wake up in a
United States where they will feel more susceptible to police abuse. The
level of protection afforded to an American citizen when stopped for a
traffic violation did not have to diminish as it did through Caballes, and,
most importantly, does not have to stay that way.
The Supreme Court could have rationalized ruling differently in a
variety of ways, such as by creating a different standard for vehicular
dog-sniffs that required, either, probable cause based on the Kyllo
standard72 or reasonable suspicion based on the Terry v. Ohio standard.73
70
71

See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). The Court held as follows:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.

Id.
See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13–14. Terry concludes that only reasonable suspicion is
necessary to stop and investigate a person because the Fourth Amendment guards against
unreasonable searches and seizures, not every search and seizure:
The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of
judicial control. It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products
of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that much
conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon
constitutional protections. Moreover, in some contexts the rule is
ineffective as a deterrent. Street encounters between citizens and
police officers are incredibly rich in diversity. They range from wholly
friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to
hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or

72
73
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For example, the Court could have simply applied the Kyllo holding and,
analogous to similar precedent, found that the dog-sniff was a search
under the Fourth Amendment.74 However, as discussed further below,
the Caballes Court found the reasoning in Kyllo problematic because it
categorizes a dog-sniff as a full-blown search, thus bringing it under the
most intense Fourth Amendment scrutiny and providing free reign of
the roadways to drug traffickers.75
B. Potential Problems With Finding That the Caballes Dog-Sniff Is a Search
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment
First, it should be noted that there was substantial precedent, other
than Kyllo, for finding that the Caballes dog-sniff was impermissible
under the Fourth Amendment. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the
Court held that police checkpoints, where drug-detection canines were
led around vehicles in pursuit of obtaining probable cause of illegal
activity, constituted Fourth Amendment violations.76 Due to the
randomness of checkpoints and the lack of actual suspicion, the
checkpoints were deemed impermissible, and the Court explained:
“When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime
control purposes at checkpoints such as here, . . . stops can only be justified
by some quantum of individualized suspicion.”77 Although the reasoning
applied in Edmond was applicable to the Caballes situation, the scenarios
were sufficiently different to determine that the expectation of privacy
for a citizen stopped at a fully random checkpoint and a citizen lawfully
stopped due to a traffic violation should be evaluated separately.
loss of life. Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece.
Some of them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a
different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into the
conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety
of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to
prosecute for crime. Doubtless some police “field interrogation”
conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. But a stern refusal by this
Court to condone such activity does not necessarily render it
responsive to the exclusionary rule.
Id. (footnote omitted).
74
See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
75
See id. at 34 (holding “that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”) (citation omitted).
76
See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (declaring that random
police checkpoints where drug-detection canines were randomly led around policestopped vehicles, in pursuit of obtaining probable cause of illegal activity, was a Fourth
Amendment violation, as there was no reasonable suspicion of the people being stopped).
77
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
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The Caballes Court seems to hone in on what the State’s brief argues
is “the fundamental distinction under the Fourth Amendment between
homes and cars.”78 “As the [Kyllo] Court explained, because ‘all details
[in the home] are intimate details,’ a reasonable expectation of privacy
lies in all aspects of the home that would otherwise remain
concealed[.]”79 “In so holding, however, the Court emphasized that the
‘firm’ and ‘bright’ line it drew ‘at the entrance to the house[]’80 would not
apply to other places, ‘such as automobiles[.]’”81 The State summarized
its argument against applying Kyllo to Caballes by stating, “[i]n cars and
other places outside the home, not all details are intimate details, and
thus all do not fall within the reasonable expectation of privacy.”82
If the Supreme Court had found that a search pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment had taken place when a dog-sniff was conducted outside a
car, the only time that a dog-sniff could be used by police to locate drugs
would be when an officer already had probable cause to believe that a
person inside the stopped vehicle had committed a crime or was in
possession of contraband based on other factors. This would greatly
reduce the usefulness of trained drug-detection dogs for determining
whether a person was in possession of contraband, because, generally, if
the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle, the officer would be
able to visibly locate the contraband.
Additionally, if a trained drug-detection dog could only be used
when an officer already had probable cause to search a vehicle, the goals
of lowering the expectation of privacy when an automobile is the subject
of a search would likely be frustrated.83 The “automobile exception to
the Fourth Amendment[] warrant requirement[]” exists because, without
the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle, if the officer was
required to obtain a warrant to search a vehicle, an automobile carrying
evidence of a crime or contraband could be moved out of the jurisdiction
of the officers and evidence could be lost.84 The justifications for this
diminished expectation of privacy stem from the fact that the driver is in
plain view, the government highly regulates driving, cars travel through
public thoroughfares, and cars must be registered by the government.85
Reply Brief for the Petitioner at *5, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (2004 WL
2398459 (October 22, 2004)) [hereinafter State’s Brief].
79
Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–38).
80
Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40).
81
Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34) (citation omitted).
82
Id.
83
See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
84
See id at 388.
85
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303–04 (1999). The Supreme Court identified
factors which contributed to the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle, stating:
78
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Applied to the Caballes scenario, where police officers are trying to
gain probable cause to make that search, if the Supreme Court had ruled
that the dog-sniff was a search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment,
police officers would be stripped of one of their main weapons in
obtaining probable cause for fighting drug-distribution.86 Although
Richard Nixon’s “war on drugs[]”87 admittedly still needs to be fought,
the government’s abuse of the American citizenry in order to effectuate
this goal cannot continue to be ruled legally acceptable. Because of the
need to classify drug-detection dog’s use as something other than a
Fourth Amendment search, the Court should create a new category of
“vehicular frisks” applicable to Caballes scenarios. This intermediate
standard, falling between the current, abuse-ripe lack of a standard for
the use of a drug-dog and the standard which requires full-blown
probable cause pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, could provide a
higher level of protection to abused classes of Americans and also give
police officers the bounded discretion they need to determine whether
suspicious individuals are in possession of contraband.
C. The Low Weight Given to Dog-Sniffs in Civil Forfeiture Cases Compared to
the Substantial Weight Given to Dog-Sniffs in Ascertaining the Probable
Cause Needed to Invade Citizens’ Privacy Is Contradictory and Troubling
When deciding Caballes, the Supreme Court could have considered,
by analogy, the weight that a drug-detection dog’s alert is given in civil
forfeiture cases to help decide that more than a mere dog-alert should be
required for finding probable cause to search a person’s vehicle. As
previously stated, both civil and criminal law apply the same probable
Even if the historical evidence, as described by Ross, were thought
to be equivocal, we would find that the balancing of the relative
interests weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a
passenger’s belongings. Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a
reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they
transport in cars, which “trave[l] public thoroughfares[] seldom serv[e]
as . . . the repository of personal effects[]”are subjected to police stop
and examination to enforce “pervasive” governmental controls “[a]s
an everyday occurrence[]” and, finally, are exposed to traffic accidents
that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny.
....
Whereas the passenger’s privacy expectations are, as we have
described, considerably diminished, the governmental interests at
stake are substantial.
Id. (citations omitted)
86
See generally California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that a warrant is not
required to search a container, package, or compartment—including the trunk—within a
vehicle provided that there is probable cause to believe that there is contraband in the vehicle).
87
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cause standard to gain access to search a citizen’s vehicle, but when
determining whether illicit activity has occurred by a preponderance of
the evidence, civil law does not recognize a dog-alert alone as sufficient
to merit forfeiture of a citizen’s personal possessions.
Generally, and with one particularly noteworthy88 and hotly
disputed89 exception, there is a higher threshold in civil cases for proving
probable cause meriting the forfeiture of money used in the purchase or
sale of contraband goods, than for establishing probable cause to search
a citizen’s vehicle under the Caballes standard in both civil and criminal
cases.90 In Florida, where during a traffic stop a police officer seizes
money solely because he is alerted to it by a drug-sniffing dog, courts
have generally followed the national consensus91 that a canine’s alert,
without the fulfillment of other factors,92 does not establish the requisite

88
See Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 505 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
Lobo held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, seizure and forfeiture of the
appellant’s money was proper, although the court explained that “[a]n alert by a trained,
experienced narcotics dog[] . . . is in itself enough to establish probable cause for an arrest,
that [a] chapter 893 [Florida statute stating that contraband goods are subject to forfeiture]
violation has occurred[,] and that the [alerted to] money is itself strong evidence that it was
involved in a drug transaction.” Id. This interpretation of probable cause for seizure is
particularly troublesome for residents of Miami-Dade County and the Florida Keys because
this highly irregular and criticized case precedent is binding in Florida’s Third Appellate
District. Id. at 625.
89
See Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (criticizing Lobo and stating that “[g]enerally, a positive alert by a drug
dog to narcotics on currency, standing alone, does not constitute evidence that the money
was used in a drug transaction.”).
90
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
91
See 167 A.L.R. Fed. 365 § 25(b). Although this is a statute-based standard, most cases
require probable cause based on a totality of the circumstances test, which a trained, drugdetection dog alert, alone, does not meet.
92
See id. In a discussion of United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency Totaling $14,665, 33 F.
Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 1998), the article states:
the court found that the government failed to demonstrate that it had
probable cause to institute a forfeiture proceeding against nearly
$15,000 in currency bundled with rubber bands and carried in suitcase
by a young man who was a member of an ethnic minority, who was
nervous and upset when the airport security guard asked him to open
his briefcase, who initially forgot the combination to his briefcase, who
purchased his ticket in cash the day of the flight, for a stay of four days
in Las Vegas, who explained that he intended to use the money to put
a down payment on a home, and who did not have the telephone
number of the friend that he was planning on meeting in Las Vegas,
notwithstanding that a trained narcotics dog alerted positively for the
presence of narcotics on the seized currency; the claimant’s story about
source of the money was reasonable and largely confirmed, the
claimant did not have criminal record, was not shown to have had
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probable cause to seize and forfeit the money.93 However, during a
lawful traffic stop, which can be based on nothing more than “reasonable
suspicion” of illegal activity,94 as well as on a minor and non-arrestable
traffic infraction, the mere alert of a narcotics-detection dog when used
to “sniff” around the exterior of the motorist’s vehicle, is not considered
a search and is sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle
for contraband.95 This dichotomy in showing probable cause is not only
inconsistent, but is unfair. The events of Caballes could have easily been
ruled unconstitutional based on the Fourth Amendment right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,96 but the Court
did not agree.
One way to examine the Caballes decision would be to recognize that
the probable cause requirement to search someone’s car should maintain
some conformity with applicable precedent when viewed from a bigpicture vantage point, specifically in relation to the civil standard for
seizure and forfeiture. To effectuate this logical approach to probable
cause, either the standard for probable cause meriting seizure and
forfeiture should be relaxed, or the standard for showing probable cause
meriting a search should be heightened.
Raising the standard for probable cause warranting a vehicular
search makes the most sense and best promotes a system of law
enforcement where individual rights are appropriately respected. The
Fourth Amendment specifically protects citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures. This has been interpreted to mean that a search
should not take place without official approval, such as through the
issuance of a warrant, unless there are particular circumstances which
make obtaining a warrant unreasonable. Considering the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the harm in
depriving an American citizen of his or her liberty through a highly
invasive search should be more difficult to inflict than the harm in
depriving the same citizen of a material possession.
personal relationships with drug dealers and was truthful with the
police.
Id. Thus, if the dog alert alone were sufficient to merit probable cause for seizure and
forfeiture, the other factors would not have been considered, and the totality test would not
be applied when considering 21 U.S.C. § 881. Id.
93
Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
94
Ronner, supra note 34, at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
96
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated[] . . . .”); see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410–413 (Souter, J., dissenting); State’s Brief,
supra note 78, at 1 (citing to the Respondent’s Brief).
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Expounding on the above analysis, both the Florida and federal
forfeiture standards97 are based on similarly worded statutes which
allow the seizure of contraband that can reasonably be linked to drug
transactions. The State of Florida codified what items may be considered
“contraband[]” and seized for forfeiture.98
These “[c]ontraband
article[s]”99 include currency “that was used, was attempted to be used,
or was intended to be used” in a drug transaction.100 This statute calls
for the application of a “totality of the facts” test when determining
whether probable cause existed to support a “nexus . . . between the
[money] seized and the narcotics activity,”101 although the statute also
points out that the use of the contraband article does not have to “be
traced to a specific narcotics transaction.”102
As applied, courts have interpreted this standard as requiring a
significant showing of facts indicating illicit activity for seizure and
forfeiture to be granted.103 Although “probable cause [to seize money]

97

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)(2000) states, in pertinent part:
(a) Subject property [to seizure and forfeiture:]
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States
and no property right shall exist in them:
....
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things
of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of
this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter.

Id.
See State of Florida Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Holguin, 909 So.
2d 956, 958-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that there was sufficient probable cause
that “seized money was used for the sale and/or purchase of contraband, based on the
totality of the circumstances.”). The case also quoted FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.701(a)(1)
(2007). The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) “Contraband Article” means:
1. Any . . . currency . . . that was used, was attempted to be used, or
was intended to be used in violation of any provision of chapter
893 . . . if the totality of the facts presented by the state is clearly
sufficient to meet the state’s burden of establishing probable cause to
believe that a nexus exists between the article seized and the narcotics
activity, whether or not the use of the contraband article can be traced
to a specific narcotics transaction.
Id. at 958.
99
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.701(a) (West 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100
Id. at § 932.701(a)(1).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
See generally Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
98
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can be established [merely through] . . . circumstantial evidence[,]”104
when seizing money found in a legally searched vehicle, courts have
considered an extensive list of factors including, but not exclusively
limited to, the following:
1. A smell of drugs emanating from inside the car,105
2. An alert made to the money by a drug-detecting police dog,106
3. Whether any illegal drugs were found within a reasonable
proximity of the money,107
4. Whether the suspect made any admission to recent drug use,108
5. Whether the money was wrapped in a manner consistent with
drug dealing (such as separated by denomination and wrapped
in rubber bands),109 and
6. Whether the suspect or suspects gave unbelievable, proven
unreliable, or conflicting stories as to the source of the money.110
In one of the more recent cases addressing this issue, State of Florida
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Holguin,111 Judge Angel
A. Cortiñas reiterated the rule that “[w]hile each one of these facts,
standing alone, may be insufficient to meet the State’s probable cause
burden, . . . the aggregation of facts based on the totality of the
circumstances is legally sufficient to satisfy the State’s burden.”112
Although the standard meriting probable cause for seizure is flexible
based on the facts presented, Florida courts almost exclusively hold113
104
Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 505 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). See also
Jones, 780 So. 2d at 951 (also stating that “[p]robable cause for forfeiture may be established
by circumstantial evidence[] . . . .”) (citation omitted).
105
See id.; see also Fitzgerald v. Metro-Dade County, 508 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
106
See State Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Holguin, 909 So. 2d 956, 959
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see also Fitzgerald, 508 So. 2d at 747; Jones, 780 So. 2d at 949.
107
See Jones, 780 So. 2d at 954. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court found
that the police officer lacked probable cause to seize $13,000 in cash currency during an
vehicle stop, where the drug dog did not alert to the money until after the cash was
removed from driver's possession and in police custody, marijuana seeds found under the
vehicle seat were so insignificant that the officer did not arrest the driver for possession or
attempt to retrieve the marijuana particles, and the driver's explanation regarding the cash
was not inconsistent. Id. The court determined that no probable cause existed to show that
the money found inside the car was “used or intended to be used in drug offenses.” Id.
108
See Holguin, 909 So. 2d at 956.
109
See id.; see also Fitzgerald, 508 So. 2d at 747; Jones, 780 So. 2d at 949; Lobo, 505 So. 2d at
621.
110
Lobo, 505 So. 2d at 623.
111
Holguin, 909 So. 2d at 956.
112
Id. at 959 (deriving its reasoning from Lobo, 505 So. 2d at 623 and Fitzgerald, 508 So. 2d
at 750).
113
See generally Lamboy v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 757 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991); see also In re Forfeiture of $37,388.00, 571 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). But see
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that a reliable drug-detecting police dog’s alert, without other factors,
does not reach the requisite level to show probable cause.114 The only
case that seemingly decided otherwise115 is highly criticized and should
be overruled, considering the broad body of sister-circuit case law both
directly and indirectly bearing against it.116 Even in Dewey, a case where
drugs were found in the same vehicle as a highly suspicious amount of
money,117 a Florida court held that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, insufficient probable cause existed to seize the money.118
In that case, “[t]he driver was arrested on [an] outstanding warrant[.]”119
Based on the warrant exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest,120
the trooper searched the vehicle, found a bag of coins and pad of paper,
and, in the trunk, “found a brown paper bag with a mason jar inside the
bag. There was $13,000 in the bag and jar.”121 He then decided to
carefully search the inside of the car:
A search of the interior of the car revealed a
marijuana cigarette and several marijuana seeds. A
canine unit was called to sniff for narcotics. The dog
alerted to the passenger door, the ashtray where the
seeds were found, and the armrest where the cigarette
was found. Upon being placed in the trunk of the car
without the bag or mason jar therein, the dog did not
alert to anything. When the bag and mason jar were
replaced in the trunk by the trooper, the dog was
Lobo, 505 So. 2d 621. Although only one case, Jones, directly disagrees with Lobo, close
examination of cases which have differentiated Lobo shows a disturbing pattern of
miniscule differences put on a pedestal in order to circumvent the seemingly unreasonable
bright-line standard that Lobo promulgates.
114
Jones, 780 So. 2d at 951–52.
115
See generally Lobo, 505 So. 2d at 621.
116
See Jones, 780 So. 2d at 951–52.
117
Id. at 953 (citing, with approval, to Dewey v. Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles, 529 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). Robinson clearly
articulated the warrant exception and scope of a search incident to arrest, stating:
It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a
traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. This general exception has historically been formulated
into two distinct propositions. The first is that a search may be made
of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second
is that a search may be made of the area within the control of the
arrestee.
Id.
121
Jones, 780 So. 2d at 953.
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brought back and alerted on the mason jar and the
money. The trooper testified that the coins and pad
were significant in that drug dealers often use pay
phones and need a pad to record their contacts.
The
Dewey
court . . . . concluded . . . that
the
circumstances created no more than a mere suspicion of
the requisite nexus between the money and criminal
activity.122
Based on this body of case law, one can reasonably conclude that in
order to merit seizure and forfeiture of money through the Florida civil
law, at a minimum, the state must show that it is more likely than not
that the particular money seized was used in violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act.123 This standard equates to the state having
to meet its burden, showing at least by a preponderance of the evidence,
probable cause to believe that the currency was used in a drug
transaction.
Next, looking to the standards for ascertaining probable cause to
conduct a search, the Supreme Court recently held that during a routine
traffic stop, allowing a trained drug-alerting police dog to sniff around
the outside of a motorist’s car was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment so long as the motorist was not unreasonably delayed.124 In
Caballes, the Supreme Court justified its decision by stating that “[o]fficial
conduct that does not ‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is
not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”125 This is a reiteration of
the Supreme Court’s abiding standard for what constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment.126
First clearly delineated in Katz v. United States,127 the Supreme Court
ruled that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, a search takes place when
(1) the person alleging a violation of his constitutional rights exhibits an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that expectation is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.128 The Caballes Court
affirmed its past holdings that “any interest in possessing contraband

Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN § 932.701.
124
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (stating that a seizure justified only by the
issuance of a traffic violation “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete that mission.”). See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
125
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).
126
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
127
Id.
128
Id. (wording taken from Professor Tamara Lawson, St. Thomas University School of
Law).
122
123
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cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only
reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy
interest.’”129
Discussed later in this Article, the assertion that this government
conduct only reveals the existence of contraband is extremely
debatable.130 Thus, it can be inferred, because the alert of the trained
drug-detecting dog does not constitute a search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, the dog’s alert, alone, is sufficient to merit probable
cause to search a vehicle for contraband. The Caballes Court had to
wrestle with a highly arguable case, Kyllo, and distinguish (some would
argue unconvincingly) binding precedent that categorized the use of
sensory-enhancement equipment as a search governed by the Fourth
Amendment.131
In summary, considering that a drug-detecting dog’s alert, alone, is
sufficient to meet the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle
when there is no indication of contraband relating to the traffic stop at
hand, coupled with the fact that the alert of the same police-trained dog
does not, alone, create probable cause in the civil context for seizure and
forfeiture of money, it is alarming that the threshold for invasion of a
potentially innocent motorist’s personal vehicle is lower than the
standard that the State must meet in order to merely dispossess a citizen
of a physical possession, such as money. Even where money is forfeited
upon a showing that it could reasonably be linked to a drug transaction,
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122–23).
See id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
131
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–37 (2001). Kyllo establishes both that the use
of sensory enhancing devices and inferences drawn from them are searches pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment by reasoning as follows:
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,” Silverman, 365 U.S., at 512, 81 S.Ct.
679, constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the
information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the
product of a search.
....
And, of course, the novel proposition that inference insulates a search
is blatantly contrary to United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct.
3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), where the police “inferred” from the
activation of a beeper that a certain can of ether was in the home. The
police activity was held to be a search, and the search was held
unlawful.
Id. (footnote omitted).
129
130
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the liberty of the money’s owner has not been compromised. Yet,
allowing an American citizen’s personal vehicle to be invaded when that
person is not accused of any illicit activity beyond that meriting a traffic
stop, creates a probable cause threshold that is so low that a
malfunctioning canine, reacting to the smell of a female dog in heat, can
breach it.132
IV. CONSIDERING THE MIDDLE GROUND: APPLICATION OF THE TERRY
REASONING
The Supreme Court could have, and should have, ruled that a dogsniff was the automotive equivalent to a frisk, and, before allowing the
police to use a drug-dog to sniff a car, should have required that the
officer have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that “[crime was]
afoot[,]” pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.133 This approach would best balance
the important governmental interest of preventing drug-trafficking and
the citizen’s fundamental constitutional right of protection against
unreasonable searches.
Instead of taking such an extreme stand that may legitimately
handcuff police from finding contraband through application of the Kyllo
standard, the Supreme Court could have applied the Terry v. Ohio134
standard for “reasonable suspicion” as the standard required in order to
walk a drug-detecting police dog around a vehicle. This standard would
equate a drug-dog’s sniffs with the allowable equivalent of a “frisk.”
The rationale for allowing an officer’s dog to sniff around the outside of
a vehicle could be similarly equated to the rationale behind allowing a
police officer to “pat-down” a citizen even though officers do not have
probable cause to fully search and arrest. This “vehicular frisk” theory
creates a middle ground where officers are prohibited from conducting a
(figurative) random pat-down of a vehicle until they have an “articulable
suspicion”135 of wrongdoing, so that the citizen is protected from the
most extreme types of abuses. On the other hand, affording citizens no
protection, the Supreme Court has not classified dog-sniffs around a
vehicle to be a Fourth Amendment search. Accordingly, no minimal
standard is imposed on police officers to directly curb abuses, such as by
limiting race as a reason for invading a citizen’s privacy. These abuses
should be curbed, and the indirect effect would be that the probable
cause standards for civil penalties, like forfeiture, and for the serious

132
133
134
135

See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
See id.
Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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depravation of physical liberty that searches pursuant to probable cause
create, would be in more logical conformity with one another.
V. LIMITING POTENTIAL FOR POLICE ABUSES AND INCREASING MINORITY
TRUST: THE ARGUMENT FOR EQUATING THE CABALLES DOG-SNIFF TO A
VEHICULAR “FRISK” UNDER THE TERRY V. OHIO STANDARD
Perhaps the biggest failure in the Caballes Court’s reasoning is that
the Court seemingly accepts that the reasoning from Kyllo can easily be
dismissed when looking at vehicle-based cases versus home-based cases
on the grounds that “[t]he legitimate expectation that information about
perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically
distinguishable from [a citizen’s] hopes or expectations concerning the
nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.”136 The Court ignores
the big-picture by focusing on one, albeit important, distinction, and it
ignores that a diminished expectation of privacy does not mean an
elimination of the citizen’s expectation of privacy.
The greatest evil that the law should be trying to prevent is abuse of
the innocent person. This can be done while still effectively policing
those who behave unlawfully. The means for allowing the invasion of
an individual’s private space, regardless of the person’s comparative
expectation of privacy between the car and a house, must be carefully
drawn to be the least intrusive, not the most intrusive. Justice Souter, in
his dissent in Caballes, identifies many federal cases in which dog alerts
were proven to be highly unreliable.137 Additionally, he noted that “a
study cited by [the State of] Illinois in [Caballes] for the proposition that
dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs in artificial testing
situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time,
depending on the length of the search.”138 If the big-picture policy that
the Court is trying to promote is the protection of the average
American’s reasonable privacy rights, finding probable cause to search a
person’s vehicle based solely on a dog-alert which may only have a fifty
percent chance of being correct139 fails each and every American
citizen.140 The very real possibility that a dog-alert is only accurate half
the time141 is probably the reason that the civil courts have almost
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
Id. at 411–12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (attacking the accuracy of drug-dogs). See supra
text accompanying note 30 (citing judicial opinions describing statistical failings of trained
drug-detection dogs).
138
Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing to State’s Brief, supra note 78, at 13).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
136
137
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universally rejected the argument that a dog-alert, alone, merits the
requisite probable cause to seize a citizen’s currency.142 In his dissent in
Caballes, Justice Souter best summarized the reason that, in circumstances
similar to Caballes, a dog-alert should not, alone, be enough to merit
probable cause to search the person when he argued, “given the
fallibility of the dog, the sniff is the first step in a process that may
disclose ‘intimate details’ without revealing contraband, just as a
thermal-imaging device might do, as described in Kyllo v. United
States[.]”143
As discussed earlier, and clearly progressing from Justice Souter’s
logic, because of the need to classify drug-detection dog use as
something other than a Fourth Amendment search, courts should create
a new category of ‘vehicular frisks’ in Caballes scenarios.144 While
[a]ttempting to analogize this case to Kyllo, [the
defendant, Caballes] notes that a drug-detection dog,
like a thermal-imaging device, reveals information about
an enclosed space that could not otherwise be obtained
without some physical intrusion. From this premise,
[Caballes] maintains that a canine sniff, while not rising
to the level of a search, may not be conducted without
some Fourth Amendment justification.145
This sound argument, despite its rejection in Caballes, hearkens back
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio,146 where the Court first
delineated the Fourth Amendment standard upon which the over-theclothes “frisk” of a suspect could be justified. Terry held that, upon
being able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably
justify an intrusion on an individual’s privacy, an officer may conduct a
limited search of persons whom he reasonably suspects to be dangerous,
with the purpose of discovering any weapons that might be used to
assault the officer or other nearby persons.147 These “Terry Stops” are
not violative of the Fourth Amendment because they are less invasive
than entering one’s home or patting down one’s clothing, and the officer
See Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (clearly stating that “[g]enerally, a positive alert by a drug dog to
narcotics on currency, standing alone, does not constitute evidence that the money was
used in a drug transaction.”).
143
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
144
See generally id. at 410–13.
145
State’s Brief, supra note 78, at *4.
146
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
147
See id.
142
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is required to have articulable facts to justify this less invasive
intrusion.148
The application of the Terry analysis to the Caballes scenario was
argued by Caballes’s amici,149 namely the American Civil Liberties
Union, which took “Kyllo a step further [than merely arguing that the
dog-sniff was a search], [by] arguing that a canine sniff is actually a
‘search,’ albeit one that requires only reasonable suspicion, not probable
cause.”150 The application of a Terry-type reasonable suspicion standard
to deciding whether to allow dog-sniffs during a lawful traffic stop
would allow for the protection of the general public, as a whole, because,
as was held in Adams v. Williams, the Supreme Court decided that it is
permissible, under a “Terry Stop,” to stop and frisk an individual
suspected of having narcotics (and a concealed weapon).151 It could even
be argued that the presence of narcotics makes it more likely that a
person would be carrying an illegal firearm, thus making a more direct
link to the specific reasoning for which the Terry Court ruled that a frisk
was not a full-blown Fourth Amendment search. An officer still needs to
protect himself and others around him from the risk of possible harm
due to the use of weapons, even though no probable cause exists to
conduct a full-blown search of a suspicious individual.152 Although it is
generally an exception to the warrant requirement, the need to conduct a
cursory “vehicular frisk” could be justified by the same “exigency”153
argument applied in drug cases such as California v. Carney. 154 In Carney,
the Court argued that not applying a Fourth Amendment warrant
exception when dealing with mobile vehicles (such as cars) and illegal
contraband, would allow an unacceptable loophole in the government’s
power to police society’s criminal element.155 Considering this societal
goal to stop crime, the movement of a car containing contraband may be
considered an emergency situation156 one which will result in harm if the
criminal is released regardless of whether “articulable suspicion”157 that
“[crime was] afoot” is feasible.158
See generally id.
State’s Brief, supra note 78, at *4.
150
Id. (citing to the A.C.L.U.’s Brief at 25–30).
151
See generally Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
152
See generally Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
153
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (describing exigent circumstances as
emergency conditions).
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See generally 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
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Id.
156
See generally Adams, 442 U.S. at 143 (considering an emergency situation to be one
where a suspicious person possesses a firearm in public).
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
158
Id. at 30.
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The hypothetical situation set forth earlier in this Article, although
still disturbing, would seem drastically different from a detached
observer’s point of view if the proposed “vehicular frisk” standard
applied. The earlier hypothetical set forth a scenario in which a police
officer made a traffic stop based solely on the race of the people in the
vehicle, and then, while writing a ticket, walked a drug-detection dog
around the vehicle. When the dog made an ambiguous noise after the
dog sniff was completed and some time passed, the officer forced the
people out of the car and thoroughly searched it. Finding nothing, he
sent the scared and harassed boys on their way. Under the “vehicular
frisk” standard, the officer could stop the vehicle and question the driver
but then would have to allow him to leave unless the officer chose to
engage in an extreme violation of the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, limiting the Fourth Amendment acceptability of an
interrogatory dog-sniff through the implementation of a “vehicular
frisk” standard, specifically when an officer merely has an articulable
suspicion that crime is afoot, could reduce the fear of citizen abuse,
improve society’s impression of police officers, and still allow police
officers the discretion needed to locate illegal contraband.
In Davis v. United States,159 the Supreme Court responded to
warnings regarding its holding not requiring police officers to ask
clarifying questions upon an ambiguous request for counsel by
explaining, “[w]e recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to
counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear,
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will
not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to
have a lawyer present.”160 This loathsome statement reveals that the
Supreme Court, in 1994, had knowledge that a certain segment of society
would suffer abuse due to a decision that could have been resolved with
the simple implementation of some further prophylactic requirement. In
particular, although he had an overall positive outlook of police officers,
Justice White expressed concern about facilitating police officer abuse of
underprivileged members of society. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
White stated as follows:
[M]ost police officers will decline the Court's invitation
and will continue to do their jobs as best they can in
159
160

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
Id. at 460.
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accord with the Fourth Amendment. But the very
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to answer the justified
fear that governmental agents cannot be left totally to
their own devices, and the Bill of Rights is enforceable in
the courts because human experience teaches that not all
such officials will otherwise adhere to the stated
precepts. Some policemen simply do act in bad faith,
even if for understandable ends, and some deterrent is
needed. In the rush to limit the applicability of the
exclusionary rule somewhere, anywhere, the Court
ignores precedent, logic, and common sense to exclude
the rule’s operation from situations in which,
paradoxically, it is justified and needed.161
Unfortunately for socioeconomically disadvantaged and minority
citizens, the Supreme Court has again made a decision which will lead to
episodes of police abuse, despite the Court’s opportunity to adopt an
alternate reasoning and decide otherwise. Hopefully the Court will
reconsider its past holdings and apply the proposed “vehicular frisk”
standard to situations similar to the one posed in Caballes.
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